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    <title>Physical Security on Counter UAV Radar — Low-Altitude Surveillance Radar</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Physical Security on Counter UAV Radar — Low-Altitude Surveillance Radar</description>
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      <title>Critical Infrastructure Protection</title>
      <link>https://www.counteruavradar.com/en/knowledge-base/critical-infrastructure-protection/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Critical infrastructure protection is often discussed as if it were a generic high-security template. In practice, it is a consequence-driven design problem. A water plant, a grid substation, a refinery control area, and a communications hub may all count as critical infrastructure, but the operational consequences of disruption, the geographic footprint, and the sensing priorities are not the same.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;CISA&amp;rsquo;s critical infrastructure framework is useful here because it treats security and resilience together. The question is not only whether an asset can detect an intrusion, but whether the organization understands the asset&amp;rsquo;s role, dependencies, and recovery implications well enough to design meaningful protective measures around it.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Perimeter Zoning Strategy for Data Centers: Fence, Roofline, and Airspace</title>
      <link>https://www.counteruavradar.com/en/knowledge-base/perimeter-zoning-strategy-for-data-centers-fence-roofline-and-airspace/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many data center sites still use a perimeter model that is too flat. Security planning starts at the fence, extends to the gate, and assumes the rest of the site sits inside one protected bubble. That model is no longer good enough for facilities whose risk posture depends on rooftop equipment, service yards, loading access, and low-altitude awareness as much as on pedestrian or vehicle intrusion at grade.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The problem is not that fences have stopped mattering. The problem is that the facility boundary and the operational boundary are no longer the same thing. Cooling infrastructure, roof-mounted systems, generator yards, cable approaches, and overhead flight paths create security geometry that a fence-only mental model cannot represent well.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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