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    <title>Vérification on Radar anti-drone — Radar de surveillance basse altitude</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Vérification on Radar anti-drone — Radar de surveillance basse altitude</description>
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      <title>Ce qu’un bon appel d’offres de sécurité civile doit demander sur la vérification, pas seulement sur la détection</title>
      <link>https://www.counteruavradar.com/fr/knowledge-base/what-a-good-civil-security-tender-should-ask-about-verification-not-just-detection/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Many civil-security tenders still ask the wrong headline question: how far can the system detect? That sounds objective, but it is usually not enough to compare proposals or protect the buyer. A detection claim only says that some layer may notice something. It does not say whether the operator can verify the event quickly enough to act, whether the evidence is usable, or whether the system can distinguish nuisance traffic from something that justifies escalation.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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