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    <title>Power Security on Counter UAV Radar — Low-Altitude Surveillance Radar</title>
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      <title>Power Plant Security Solutions</title>
      <link>https://www.counteruavradar.com/knowledge-base/power-plant-security-solutions/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Aug 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Power plant security solutions should be designed around consequence and continuity. A plant is not just a fenced property. It is a generating asset connected to safety procedures, control systems, maintenance routines, and broader grid or fuel dependencies. That means a surveillance system should help the site protect critical assets while preserving safe operations during abnormal events.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Regulatory and sector guidance reflects this consequence-based logic. The NRC uses a graded physical protection approach for nuclear facilities, while FERC and the broader bulk-power reliability framework treat physical security as part of dependable grid operation. The common lesson is that power-security design should be tied to asset criticality, not generalized perimeter doctrine.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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